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Japan’s current military operations in Africa, little known and underreported, have 
challenged its established security doctrine and led it to a more “normal” military that 
employs its self-defense forces in ever-greater roles. By examining Japan’s Self-Defense 
Force (JSDF) missions in the Gulf of Aden and South Sudan against a backdrop of 
Japan’s greater strategic approach to Africa, this thesis uncovers the unexpected impact 
that these missions have had in Japanese policy-making at home.  Whereas the lack of a 
constrained institutional framework in the Gulf of Aden mission naturally enables 
revisionists to push for unprecedented security reforms to meet evolving mission 
requirements, the mission in South Sudan has also contributed unexpectedly to impactful 
security reforms to meet its own evolving mission requirements within the construct of 
the United Nations (UN).  Mission success in increasingly challenging and dangerous 
roles in Africa has allowed the JSDF to not only become an integral part of Japan’s 
comprehensive development efforts on the continent, but has also influenced the ability 
of Japan’s revisionists to chart a new course in the post-Cold War world.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Japan’s evolving military presence in Africa promises improved regional security, 
humanitarian assistance, and economic ties with African nations, but also provides an 
opportune mechanism to further a normalization agenda and achieve Japan’s own brand 
of “proactive pacifism.” As a key objective of Japan’s current administration, developing 
Japan’s Self Defense Force (JSDF) into a more “normal” military goes well beyond the 
military itself, and has national implications as Japan charts a new course in a post-Cold 
War world. Though less constrained by legal restrictions originally designed to pacify a 
potentially resurgent militarist Japan, the JSDF still faces three major challenges, among 
others, in its evolution toward a truly “normal” military: the prevalence of self-imposed 
legal roadblocks, the effect that a renewed Japanese military has on perceptions abroad, 
and a general lack of operational experience. Africa presents a valuable opportunity for 
Japan to confront all three of these issues through its various international engagements 
on the continent and the legal reinterpretations necessary to take part in them, moving 
Japan well beyond the traditional role of home defense by leading it to employ the JSDF 
in ever greater roles. Africa is not without its risks, however: open conflict in South 
Sudan poses a serious threat to Japanese troops, while recent hostage crises in Algeria 
and Tunisia claimed the lives of several Japanese civilians, directing greater inquiry into 
the increased use of the JSDF as a tool of Japanese foreign policy.  
This thesis attempts to bridge the gap of understanding between the larger 
normalization debate—whether the JSDF should assume the role of a military not limited 
to self-defense alone—and Japan’s deployed forces in Africa by identifying how military 
involvement on the continent has challenged established security doctrine and, in turn, 
contributed to furthering a normalization agenda. Analysis revolves around two case 
studies, each investigating Japan’s respective JSDF missions in the Gulf of Aden and 
South Sudan. In order to frame Japan’s military efforts in Africa in the correct context, an 
examination of the overall normalization debate, its regional foreign aid practices, 
peacekeeping operations, economic initiatives, and the activities of its chief rival, China, 
are included. Finally, conclusions are offered based on the various forms of evidence 
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provided. The scope of the thesis is limited to a military-centric analysis of Japan’s 
activities in Africa—although Africa does not merely represent a mission space to be 
exploited by Japan, an examination of the various other factors relevant to a discussion of 
Japan’s activities in Africa requires research dedicated to each. Japan’s military 
operations in Africa, though little-known and relatively unpublicized, have an important 
place in the normalization debate and will continue to have foreign policy implications on 
one of the world’s most influential nations, in turn offering a glimpse into a future 
security trajectory new to the post-war era.  
A. JAPAN’S SECURITY IDENTITY 
The current international environment presents both challenges and opportunities 
for the further normalization of Japan’s JSDF. As a country defined by a dichotomy  
of old and new and subject to the lessons of its past, Japan has viewed these challenges 
and opportunities through the lenses of both its pacifist norms and its pragmatic 
understanding of its role in the world. These same underpinnings that guided Japan’s 
policies since the end of World War II continue to provide a useful conceptual framework 
to better understand Japan’s current military involvement in Africa.  
Japan’s perception of itself, largely based on a long-standing security identity of 
anti-militarism following World War II, combined with other intangible factors, such as 
increasing expectations of the international community, nationalism, and reactions to a 
weakening economy, has played a key role in the overall normalization debate.1 This 
unique identity has structured policy debate and choices over national security-related 
issues for so long because it is widely supported by Japan’s strong democracy and 
because of the perception that it has contributed greatly to the country’s post-war 
success.2 While under the American security umbrella, Japan’s economic success as the 
“lead goose” among Asian nations enabled Japan to contribute increasing amounts of aid 
                                                 
1 Masaru Tanamoto, “How Japan Imagines China and Sees Itself,” World Policy Journal 22, no. 4 
(Winter, 2005/2006): 56, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209995. 
2 Andrew L. Oros, “International and Domestic Challenges to Japan’s Postwar Security Identity: 
‘Norm Constructivism’ and Japan’s new ‘proactive pacifism’,” The Pacific Review 28, no. 1 (2015): 142, 
doi: 10.1080/09512748.2014.970057. 
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to the preservation of international peace. When Japan took a more direct approach to 
international peace by becoming involved in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 
operations, it legitimized the role of the military in the eyes of the Japanese public, and 
the JSDF started to become socially acceptable after years of being dismissed. More 
recently, the JSDF’s image was further strengthened given its contributions during 
Japan’s 3.11 “triple disaster,” its earthquake response efforts in Kumamoto, and the 
Japanese public’s renewed focus on the U.S./Japan relationship given East Asia’s 
changing geo-political landscape.3 
Japan’s residual anti-militaristic sentiment, its junior alliance relationship with the 
United States, and a general reluctance to aggressively pursue military capabilities 
commensurate with its economic power suggest that Japan will likely continue to be a 
constrained military actor for some time to come.4 At the same time, Japan’s self-
proclaimed status as the “largest maritime democracy,” its membership in the world’s 
liberal community, and increasing international expectations that accompany its global 
status suggest the need to be able to protect its democracy, rule of law, and freedom of 
expression from outside threats.5 The recent emphasis placed on the international 
community, democratic norms and values, and human rights by Prime Minister Abe, 
commonly referred to as the “Abe doctrine,” is itself unprecedented.6 This doctrine, 
proclaimed at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Jakarta on 
January 18, 2013, clearly places Japan among other law-abiding democracies that seek to 
preserve the political status quo through international cooperation and the rule of law.7 
Therefore, despite Japan’s currently being a constrained military actor, slowly evolving 
                                                 
3 Sam Bateman, “Piracy and Maritime Security: Japan’s Strategic Challenges,” Japan’s Strategic 
Challenges in a Changing Regional Environment (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2013), 4.  
4 Christopher Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, The Adelphi Papers, 48:403, (2008): 19–20, doi: 
10.1080/05679320902955211. 
5 John Nilsson-Wright and Kiichi Fujiwara, “Japan’s Abe Administration: Steering a Course between 
Pragmatism and Extremism,” Asia Programme (September 2015): 7.   
6 Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara, “Japan’s Abe Administration,” 7.  
7 Ibid., 8. 
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norms and geo-political posturing suggest a long-term trajectory aimed at more assertive 
regional and global security roles.8 
The pragmatic, realist approach to national security, embodied by nationalists and 
revisionists in Japan, proposes a more “normal” Japan—one that generally pursues a 
proactive international foreign policy and security role that abandons self-imposed 
constraints on the exercise of military power, enables Japan to become a more reliable 
U.S. ally, and empowers it to become a more assertive military actor.9 This infers the 
implicit dilution of Japan’s pacifist identity that has supposedly hindered its ability to 
properly respond to past threats. As Article IX of Japan’s “peace constitution” 
symbolizes this pacifist identity, it must be subject to reinterpretation that eventually 
renders it more and more insignificant over time, or to outright revision in order to 
eliminate the threat it poses to Japanese sovereignty. In subscribing to this viewpoint, 
Japan’s counterintuitive imbalance between its strong economy and weak political voice, 
an arrangement maintained for generations under the American security umbrella, must 
be corrected, especially given the recent swing in the balance of power toward China. 
Recently, with the mention by the Japanese government of China as a “threat” and as a 
state that “attempts to change the status quo by coercion,” such perceived threats are 
indeed institutionalized in the policymaking process.10 
As regional concerns, such as the rise of China and an increasingly unpredictable 
North Korea, increase, the effects of a pacifist identity can become increasingly 
overwhelmed by realist considerations. Prime Minister Abe’s hawkish stance on foreign 
policy issues highlights the apparent erosion of Japan’s pacifist identity given a more 
proactive foreign policy that seeks a more assertive military role in East Asia and 
beyond.11 Even before Prime Minister Abe, former Prime Minister Ichiro Ozawa, then 
Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), realized during the 
                                                 
8 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, 19–20. 
9 L. Black, “Debating Japan’s Intervention to Tackle Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Beyond Mainstream 
Paradigms,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 12 (2012): 260. 
10 Oros, “International and Domestic Challenges to Japan’s Postwar Security Identity,” 145. 
11 Black, “Debating Japan’s Intervention to Tackle Piracy,” 260. 
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Persian Gulf crisis of 1991 that the means to resolve this conflict, considered the first 
international crisis of the post-Cold War period, would define the new international order 
and security environment.  Likewise, Japan’s lack of military contributions to the crisis 
would have a detrimental effect on Japan’s international standing.12 A more realist-
minded approach since the 1990s has subsequently led some to question an apparently 
superficial peace-loving security narrative, or to go as far as to claim outright the 
irrelevance of modern Japan’s pacifist identity.  
B. THE NORMALIZATION DEBATE 
Japan’s “normalization debate”—the debate on whether Japan’s Self Defense 
Force (JSDF) should assume the role of a normal military—is centered around Article IX 
of Japan’s post-war “peace constitution,” the strikingly concise section that addresses 
Japan’s ability to wage war. Included in its text is a renouncement of war as a means to 
solve international disputes, the inability to maintain war potential, and the refusal to 
recognize the right of belligerency.13 Since its ratification in 1946, constitutional 
restrictions have played an overbearing role in restricting Japanese defense policy and 
perpetuating civilian controls that limited the ability of the JSDF to effectively conduct 
military operations. While Japan’s post-war leaders were focused on economic growth 
and receiving assurances of America’s willingness to provide a security umbrella over 
Japan, it remained politically explosive to suggest a greater military role for the fledgling 
JSDF. This system of strict civilian control nevertheless served its intended purpose of 
impeding the basic functions of the JSDF throughout much of the Cold War.  
The intent of Article IX, mainly to keep imperial Japan in check while ensuring 
the survivability of an initially weak American-led interim government, was gradually 
lost in the evolving context of the Cold War and beyond. Despite Article IX’s clear 
terms, Japan’s JSDF has gradually expanded its roles and become less constrained 
                                                 
12 Bhubhindar Singh, “Peacekeeping in Japanese Security Policy: International-Domestic Contexts 
Interaction,” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 3 (2010), 439, doi: 
10.1177/1354066110364422. 
13 The Constitution of Japan, The Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, last modified April 24, 
2016, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. 
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through opportunistic constitutional reinterpretation pushed mostly by revisionist 
leaders.14 Starting with the Korean War, the perceived need to normalize arose from the 
evolving security arrangement between Japan and the United States in response to the 
rising communist threat. After the Cold War, Japan found itself with no explicit 
adversaries, only non-traditional threats, including involvement in America’s “war on 
terror” and North Korea’s weapons development program. This allowed Japan to start 
looking seriously at global issues, indicating the high priority placed on stabilizing 
maritime commons and constructing a desirable security environment.15 Fortunately for 
the JSDF, this noticeable shift toward a more proactive defense posture has slowly gained 
steam to the point that security laws have taken less and less time to be approved by the 
Diet, starting with the passing of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, the 
first reinterpretation of the ban on dispatching forces overseas, and shortly thereafter the 
approval of the JSDF Law amendment in 1994.16 Defense operations initiatives, such as 
the revision to the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law in 2001, the decision to send 
JMSDF ships to the Indian Ocean to support the coalition’s Afghan campaign that same 
year, and the 2004 JSDF deployment to Iraq, were all approved within a mere month of 
submission to the Diet. Beginning with initial efforts to upgrade the Japan Defense 
Agency (JDA) to ministry status in 1954, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was finally 
created in 2006, granting the new ministry and the JSDF newfound powers in 
government through direct control over budgets and policy. Finally, the integration of 
Japan’s Joint Staff Office (JSO) represents the biggest transfer of authority to uniformed 
personnel in Japan’s post-war history. Today, Japan now clearly finds itself in the midst 
of a major overhaul of its defense establishment. While defense reforms in other 
                                                 
14 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2007), 91. 
15 Keitaro Ushirogata, “Japan’s Security Environment: Its Transition and Strategic Challenges,” 
(presentation at JMSDF Command and Staff College, Tokyo, October 20, 2015). 
16 Yasushi Sukegawa. “Political Opposition to a Working SDF: From a Legal Perspective.” NIDS 
Security Reports, 53, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2007/ bulletin_e2007_4.pdf. 
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“mature” democracies usually take place at the margins, Japan’s reforms are taking place 
at the core.17  
Paradoxically, Japan has managed to build one of the largest militaries in the 
world without making a single change to its constitution. The JSDF presently has the fifth 
largest defense budget in the world (U.S. $44.4 billion) and employs 300,000 active duty 
and reserve personnel.18 Its Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) utilizes 1,000 tanks and 
1,300 armored vehicles, its Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) maintains 370 aircraft, and 
its Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) maintains 160 ships. It regularly conducts 
major training missions with coalition partners and is able to respond to real-world crises, 
such as those occurring in the Gulf of Aden and South Sudan, in some cases better than 
supposedly “normal” militaries. Despite these capabilities, with no revisions since its 
endorsement, Japan’s constitution essentially states that the JSDF has no due process of 
law in which to engage in warfare and instead must rely on highly-scrutinized case-by-
case parliamentary approvals by the Diet (essentially passing a new law) to mobilize or 
even make minor structural changes.19 In this respect, Japan faces the opposite problem 
of many of the world’s new defense establishments in that its strong civilian base is 
slowly incorporating a physically strong but politically weak military.20 The need to 
reconcile its supposedly defense-oriented military with its official policies remains a 
persistent problem in Japan and has continued to hinder the development of an efficient 
and effective defense establishment.21  
The current prime minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, is the current head of Japan’s 
long-ruling LDP and is seen as a right-wing nationalist. Having already served as prime 
                                                 
17 Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze, “Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control”, in 
Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau 
and Scott D. Tollefson, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006, 91. 
18 Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2016 Budget Bill,” Japan Ministry of 
Defense, last modified March 13, 2016, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/ 280215.pdf. 
19 Tongxun She Zhongguo, “Japan’s Upgrade of Defense Agency Paves Way to Military Power–HK 
Based Agency,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 27, 2006. 
20 Bruneau and Goetze, “Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control”, 76. 
21 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 (December 2008): 911. 
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minister in 2006–07, before being ousted due to his over-emphasis on normalization at 
the cost of the economy, he has pursued a new economic formula, “Abenomics,” which 
has given him a platform to accomplish his normalization objectives. After reassuming 
power, the LDP, led by a renewed Prime Minister Abe, was eager to attend to unfinished 
business, including Abe’s efforts to establish a National Security Council (NSC) and 
implement a law allowing the dispatch of JSDF troops without a UN resolution.22 Several 
other security reforms were subsequently introduced by Prime Minister Abe: an increase 
in the defense budget (2013), the introduction of a National Security Strategy (NSS) 
(2013), a relaxation of arms exports limitations (2014), further reinterpretations of Article 
IX (2014), and new policies on the exercise of collective self-defense (2015).23 On 
September 18, 2015, Japan’s parliament voted to authorize overseas military responses 
for the first time since World War II in an apparent response to an increase in Chinese 
military activity.24 Interestingly, many of these changes were set in motion not by Prime 
Minister Abe’s LDP, but by the opposition party, the left-leaning Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ). The DPJ was the first to lift restrictions on arms exports and proposed quick 
and flexible responses to emergency situations, including a southward-looking focus for 
JSDF forces as opposed to a country-wide defense posture.25 
Recent reform efforts have been stimulated by the perception of a more 
challenging security environment, changes in Japan’s policy environment, and lessons 
learned from the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011.26 Prime Minister Abe has 
made Japan’s national security one of his top priorities, and financial backing indeed 
reflects this: the defense budget is the largest it has been in 14 years, at U.S. $42.38 
                                                 
22 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, “The U.S.–Japan Alliance,” Congressional Research 
Service, February 9, 2016, 29, www.crs.gov. 
23 Alexandra Sakaki, “Japan’s Security Policy: A Shift in Direction Under Abe?,” SWP Research 
Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, March, 2015, 5. 
24 BBC News, “Japan to Allow Military Role Overseas in Historic Move,” last modified September 
18, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34287362. 
25 Crystal Pryor, “Japan’s Security Policy Under Abe: Much Ado About Almost Nothing,” Pacific 
Forum CSIS, PacNet no. 33 (March 31, 2016). 
26 “Defense of Japan 2015 (Annual White Paper),” Japan Ministry of Defense, last modified March 
13, 2016, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2015.html. 
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billion, up 2.2 percent from 2015.27 It is important to note that Japan is thought to limit 
defense-related expenditures to 1 percent of total GNP, a significant amount considering 
Japan is one of the world’s largest economies, yet defense expenditures have consistently 
exceeded the 1 percent limit since the 1980s, actually fluctuating between 1.1 percent and 
1.5 percent. This is possible because the defense budget is not calculated on a NATO 
basis, which would include pensions and Japan Coast Guard (JCG) expenses, as well as 
the use of deferred payments and so-called “hidden budgets” that grant the government 
flexibility in surpassing the formal 1 percent limit.28 Regardless, Prime Minister Abe’s 
reversing of a more recent trend of consecutive decreases in defense spending 
(attributable mainly to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute) occurred simultaneously with 
defense reforms, essentially allowing Japan to eliminate geographic constraints, authorize 
support to non-U.S. troops, expand the range of allowable logistical support, allow allied 
interaction in gray-zone scenarios, enable more timely deployment of the JSDF for 
multilateral operations, create less restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE), and, finally, 
allow the JSDF to protect friendly nations’ military assets.29 These changes modify but 
undoubtedly strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, indicating that Japan is finally moving 
out of the Cold War and into the forefront of regional security affairs.30  
To some critics, especially those countries supposedly seeking to mischaracterize 
Japan’s recent defense reforms, Japan’s continued constitutional reinterpretation renders 
its “peace constitution” meaningless and indicates a resurgent militarist Japan. Others 
may argue, however, that Japan’s new perceived strategic environment dictates that it can 
no longer be purely defensive. Japan does indeed face undeniable threats: North Korea 
continues to expand its nuclear weapons capabilities, China is rapidly modernizing its 
                                                 
27 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan’s Defense Ministry Wants Record Military Budget for 2016,” The 
Diplomat, September 1, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/japans-defense-ministry-wants-record-
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military and perhaps attempting to polarize the region, and there is a perception that the 
security commitment from the United States could possibly falter. However relevant 
these threats may be, critics of Japan’s normalization efforts often overlook a process that 
has been ongoing since the Cold War, and oftentimes dismiss a logical consequence of a 
country now ready to become “normal” after over 71 years of peace. By using his coined 
term, “proactive pacifism,” announced at the UN General Assembly in September 2013, 
Prime Minister Abe is simultaneously attempting to confront these issues with a 
transformed notion of self-determination while still maintaining a commitment to peace 
as a guiding principle. 
At the very least, Japan’s defense budget and military strength grant it significant 
power-projection capabilities beyond its home shores, even though its current 
procurement and utilization of military assets is generally intended for defense-oriented 
power projection. These assets of course have latent offensive power, however, and when 
given expanded authorities, allow increased support to UN peacekeeping missions, 
overseas deployments, and global contingencies, also creating a new potential mobile 
shield for U.S. offensive power.31 In addition to existing interoperable capabilities such 
as an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, the use of Japan’s advanced 
naval, amphibious, and airlift capabilities in the Indian Ocean, Iraq, and, recently, the 
Kumamoto earthquake response attest to Japan’s significant military strength and 
partnership with the United States.32 Given Japan’s new assumed international 
responsibilities, recent defense reforms simply augment allied deterrence and defense 
capabilities and serve to preserve peace in Asia while checking growing regional security 
threats.33 Interestingly, as of February 2016, more than 90 percent of the Japanese public 
has a favorable impression of the JSDF, a sign that adds credibility to the JSDF and 
supports its legitimacy as a global peacekeeping force.34  
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Japan finds itself in a world much different than that of the Cold War: a 
multipolar world in which the effect of nuclear deterrence is now questioned, one in 
which powerful states are now competing to establish a new global status quo, and one in 
which wars are not fought at the strategic level of a full industrial war in cycles of war 
and peace, but rather through a dynamic of frequent confrontation and conflict.35 To 
Japan, emerging threats from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
international terrorism, cyber-attacks, and a shifting in the global balance of power to 
China, in particular, indicate a more severe security environment than past years. China’s 
defense budget, 3.3 times larger than Japan’s defense-related expenditures in FY 2015, 
itself has increased 360 percent in the past 10 years, and 4,100 percent in the past 27 
years.36 Japan has responded to these new-world threats by focusing its military efforts 
on both high-intensity, conventional conflicts, and maritime law enforcement capabilities 
for use in low-level disputes. In these efforts, maritime deterrence in defense of the 
current global, liberal economic status quo and the difficulty in responding to frequent 
territorial disputes divides Japan’s military resources between homeland defense and 
stabilization of the maritime domain.37 Japan has responded to this dilemma by 
recognizing the increased significance of coordination with its allies and global 
organizations, such as the UN, to portray Japan as a democratic and law-abiding country 
to make it easier for countries and institutions, such as ASEAN, to align themselves with 
Japan.38 Japan’s approach to ensuring its national and maritime security and 
strengthening its diplomatic efforts naturally extends to Africa, and has played an 
important role in allowing the JSDF to develop its capabilities in order to respond to the 
array of events unfolding there. Likewise, by taking advantage of opportunities in global 
conflict, revisionists can better pursue their domestic goal of achieving a more normal 
military in the process. In the next chapter, we will explore the historical context of 
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Japan’s involvement in Africa, then apply the lessons learned from its foreign aid, 
peacekeeping, and defense-industry initiatives on the continent to gain a better 
understanding of its security-related motivations. 
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II. JAPAN IN AFRICA 
The relationship between Africa and Japan may at first seem counterintuitive—
after all, they are located on opposite sides of the world and have had relatively little 
historical interaction. Association with Africa, however, has evolved and strengthened 
over the years to reach a prominent place on Japan’s current foreign policy agenda. 
Starting with mere resource extraction in support of its economic engine in the 1960s, 
Japan increased its interest in solidifying political guarantees to those resources and 
gaining international prestige following the two major oil crises in the 1970s.39 In the 
1980s and 1990s, visits by Japanese foreign ministers to Africa signified the beginning of 
a boom in foreign aid and relationship-building. Incredibly, in 1989 and from 1991 to 
1998, Japan’s aid contributions surpassed offerings from any other country in the world 
(as a percentage of GDP), establishing foreign aid as a key characteristic of Japan’s role 
in Africa.40 Japan, eager to assume a greater role in ensuring peace and stability in the 
region, took part in its first African UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique in 1993, 
leading to participation in several others across the continent. Attention gradually shifted 
to integrating its development-focused aid, which reached U.S. $1.5 billion in 2008 
despite economic setbacks at home, with investments increasing from U.S. $8.8 billion in 
2001 to $34.3B in 2008.41 Japanese leaders also began to indicate their eagerness to 
establish improved ties in the region, beginning with Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit in 
2001 and Prime Minister Mori’s visit in 2006.  
Human rights, human security, and peace-related values have always had an 
influence on the formation of Japan’s policies in Africa, combining idealist elements with 
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realist designs based on national interest.42 Japan’s humanitarian involvement in the 
region started as far back as the 1950s, yet scant media attention on these efforts 
indicated a perception of Japan as a country that was atoning for its previous war 
exploits, or one that was simply being overshadowed by larger international efforts.43 In 
any case, its growing status as a leader in African development and the notion of Japan as 
the “intellectual leader in the field of African aid” granted it political dividends that 
would help to raise its political stature on the world stage.44 With a booming economy, 
Japan also benefited from its early aid contributions to geopolitically significant or 
resource-rich countries such countries as Egypt, Tanzania, Kenya, and South Africa. Its 
use of aid contributions as an overt economic tool ended, however, given the passage of 
the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter of 1992 that explicitly tied Japanese 
aid to the hegemonic neoliberal order of the “West” and Japan.45 At its core, the ODA 
Charter attempts to submit recipient countries to the disciplines of neoliberalism with 
four outlined preconditions:  
1. Recipients must “commit themselves to the adoption of free-market 
economies.”  
2. Recipients must promote democratization and human rights. 
3. Recipients must consider environmental conservation in their 
development. 
4. Recipients must curtail military expenditures and not use aid for military 
purposes.46  
The ODA Charter signified a fundamental change in Japan’s approach to Africa 
and soon resulted in Japan’s suspending its aid to China in 1996 due to that country’s 
military exercises in the Strait of Taiwan, and its later suspending aid to Sudan, Nigeria, 
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and Gambia due to associated Charter violations.47 At the same time, Japan’s promotion 
of neoliberal democracies in Africa naturally led it gradually to direct its aid to the 
combination of economically profitable and politically like-minded countries. On the 
normalization front, Japan’s efforts to achieve legitimacy through the liberal 
internationalist order likewise helped to insulate it from accusations that Japan’s 
revisionism would bring it back to its pre-war militaristic policies.48 
The common medium through which Japan’s aid donations to Africa are now 
directed is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), a 
multilateral forum initiated by Japan in 1993 and co-hosted by the UN Development 
Program, the World Bank, and the African Union Commission (AUC). With heads of 
state, international governments, donors, private companies, and civil society 
organizations in attendance, TICAD, now held every 3 years starting in 2016, is a vital 
extension of Japan’s Afro-Asian bloc diplomacy. By granting specified countries duty-
free access to exports destined for Japan, it signifies Japan’s attempt to bring Africa into 
the global economy by promoting links between African and Japanese investors.49 In 
essence, it aligns Japan’s aid contributions, now one of its primary foreign policy 
enablers, with its own unique economic neoliberalism agenda by “adapting Asian models 
[of development] to the African setting,” as indicated by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA).50 This creates an alternate development model somewhere in between 
Western neoliberal economics and the loose economic governance offered by China.51 
The next TICAD summit (TICAD VI), scheduled for August 27–28, 2016, will take place 
in Nairobi, Kenya, and will be the first to be held in Africa. Its being held in Kenya is no 
accident—Japan’s contributions to Kenya include annual aid commitments of U.S. $200–
300 million, U.S. $100 million in grants and technical cooperation in 2013, and direct 
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involvement in such projects as the Mombasa Port and country-wide power generation 
upgrades.52  
Japan’s perception as a developed but non-imperial power has made it an 
especially attractive lender to Africa, allowing Japan to incorporate foreign aid, 
peacekeeping, business, and now security to achieve its foreign policy goals. The first use 
of Japan’s status as a “lender of first resort” to propel a security agenda, however, 
actually took place in Southeast Asia in the 1990s, after Japan contributed to the 
successful anti-piracy mission in the Straits of Malacca through the Regional Cooperation 
on Agreement on Combating Piracy Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) program, the 
world’s first regional organization established solely to combat piracy.53 Through 
financial assistance, the donation of defense-related equipment, and the coordination of 
anti-piracy efforts among several Southeast Asian nations, this security initiative not only 
allowed Japan to secure a vital transit point for its merchant fleet, but also utilized its 
civil law enforcement arm, the JCG, for the first time overseas. This legacy continues 
today with Japan’s extensive financial contributions to African security initiatives to 
ensure uninterrupted trade access and to promote a stable environment suitable to 
business interests. Indeed, there are increasingly more business interests to protect: from 
2001 to 2008, Japan’s trade with Africa increased from U.S. $8.8 billion to U.S. $34.3 
billion, representing a 366 percent increase in African exports to Japan and a 200 percent 
increase in Japanese exports to Africa.54  
Prime Minister Abe’s recent visit to the Ivory Coast, Mozambique, and Ethiopia 
from January 10–14, 2014, was particularly indicative of Japan’s comprehensive and 
renewed interest in the continent. With meetings with thirteen heads of state on several 
occasions, this trip was the first full-scale visit to Africa by a Japanese prime minister in 
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8 years, and the first visit by a Japanese prime minister to Francophone West Africa.55 
Considered regional entry points by Japan, the three host countries welcomed a total of 
thirty-three Japanese companies, organizations, and universities accompanied by the 
Prime Minister, who himself signed a total of fourteen agreements.56 These agreements 
largely aim to secure raw materials, promote local investment, and guarantee a stable 
energy source for Japan, especially given the setbacks from the nuclear disaster in 
Fukushima.  
Mozambique, with one of the largest natural gas fields in the world and one of the 
largest coking coal fields in Africa, provides an excellent example of a preferred aid 
recipient that, through its vital natural resource exports, sees a vested security interest 
from Japan. As a country in which Japan had previously conducted UN operations in, 
Japan’s substantial investments in Mozambique led President Guebuza of Mozambique to 
applauded Japan’s leading role in Africa’s development as a “proactive contributor” in 
regional and global peace and stability.57 These investments include Mitsubishi 
Corporation’s partnership with Mozal, a major joint project in the country, leading to the 
building of an aluminum smelter that remains the largest industry in the country to-
date.58 Japan also plans to invest an additional U.S. $670 million in ODA on the 
development of Mozambique’s resource-rich Nacala Corridor region.59  
At his last stop at the headquarters of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abe—by highlighting its value of human resources and creative 
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ingenuity—appealed to African nations to incorporate Japan’s unique approach to 
development in their future development plans. In his keynote address, “Japan’s 
Diplomacy toward Africa: Strengthening Each Individual, One by One,” Prime Minister 
Abe referred to a gradual cultural shift toward Japanese work practices and business 
collaboration, increasingly enjoyed by Southeast Asian countries, as now emerging in 
Africa.60 Ethiopia is also important to Japan as an intermediary in discussions on 
peacekeeping operations in South Sudan through the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD).61  
Japan’s extensive aid contributions in Africa, now mainly granted to promising 
states willing to incorporate the Japanese model of development, take on a regional 
perspective as Japan hopes to achieve wider political appeal on the continent by also 
contributing to “outlying countries,” or those countries that have not yet seen substantial 
aid contributions from Japan, in the hope of incorporating them into the Japanese 
model.62 In 2011, for instance, Japan was one of the first countries to announce its 
assistance to Mali at the outset of its civil war with Islamist militants.63 At a speech to the 
African Union in 2014, Prime Minister Abe offered U.S. $320 million in total funds 
directed to conflict resolution and disaster response in such areas as South Sudan (U.S. 
$25 million), the Sahel region (U.S. $83.4 million), and the African-led International 
Support Mission in the Central African Republic (U.S. $3 million), while doubling the 
amount of Enhanced Private Sector Assistance (EPSA) loans (which are co-financed by 
Japan and the African Development Bank).64 In conjunction with government efforts, 
some private companies are also investing in outlying countries, such as Yamaha 
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Corporation’s venture to teach Mauritanian nationals shipbuilding techniques, giving that 
country its first modern shipyard.65  
An analysis of Japan’s military activities in Africa would not be complete without 
also considering China’s growing influence in the region given the strategic rivalry 
between the two countries. For much of the latter half of the twentieth century, China and 
Japan employed dissimilar strategies in Africa—Japan’s ties, at least on the surface, were 
non-political and focused on raw materials, while China overtly promoted Maoism in the 
1970s then afterwards retreated from Africa during its economic modernization program 
at home.66 It was not until the 1990s that both countries recognized the potential of 
Africa as a useful tool to support their respective political goals in the international 
system which required the facilitation of a sympathetic support base across Africa.67 
China’s current approach to Africa generally provides an alternative to the “aid 
with conditions” approach, used by some Western nations and Japan in varying degrees, 
by stressing its non-interference in domestic politics. For this reason, among others, 
politically unstable and corrupt regimes in Africa have been more than willing to open 
their doors to Chinese investment. Prime Minister Li Peng indicated this position as early 
as 1990 by stating that, “no country is allowed to impose its will on other countries [or] to 
interfere in the international affairs of developing countries, or pursue power politics in 
the name of human rights, freedom, and democracy.”68 Capable of exploiting its status as 
a supposedly besieged and non-imperial country itself undergoing development, China 
poses a direct challenge to Japan’s once-unique position as Asia’s primary aid provider in 
Africa.69 Africa naturally serves as an additional venue for competition between the two 
countries, and this is exacerbated by China and Japan’s strained relations at home, 
originating mainly from the challenge posed by a more powerful China to Asia’s post-
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Cold War security arrangement and its assertive island seizing operations in the East and 
South China Seas. A general consensus in Chinese sources criticizes Japan’s apparent 
fears of being left behind in Africa by a rapidly growing China and accuses Japan of 
fabricating prerogatives to transform itself into a normal power.70 Because China 
represents increased competition for strategic influence in the broader international 
community, Japan’s current mission commitments in the Gulf of Aden and South Sudan 
risk being overshadowed by China’s overwhelming economic and political initiatives.71 
To further explore this Japanese concern, an examination of China’s activities in Africa 
relative to the two JSDF missions in the Gulf of Aden and South Sudan will be presented 
in the respective case studies. 
If Prime Minister Abe’s trip to Africa can serve as any indication, it would 
suggest a refocus of Japan’s efforts in Africa to a few key states, those that represent 
viable complements to Japanese aid and investment, which in turn showcase the Japanese 
model to other states across the continent. This development-focused strategy would 
therefore differ from previous aid-focused efforts that carried with them more explicit 
diplomatic goals.72 In any case, Japan’s disproportionate economic assistance to Africa 
and its creation of and participation in regional multilateral organizations has 
undoubtedly brought the level of its political power closer to its well-established 
economic power. Aside from just promising economic benefits, Africa therefore 
represents to Japan a viable opportunity to increase its international status, evolve into a 
“normal nation,” and enhance its soft power through the marketing of its own 
development model.73 While the Japanese public, media, and government previously had 
little perceived incentive to engage with Africa other than resource extraction, Africa’s 
economic, political, and geo-strategic relevance to Japan’s larger foreign policy goals has 
increased and now demands attention. 
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III. THREE OUTCOMES AND ASSOCIATED HYPOTHESES 
Japan’s two current JSDF missions in Africa—the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf 
of Aden and the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan—provide useful case studies 
through which to determine whether JSDF activities in Africa challenge established 
security doctrine and in turn contribute to furthering a normalization agenda. Given our 
understanding of the general normalization debate and Japan’s overall geo-political 
strategy in Africa thus far, each of the case studies should fall into one of the following 
three categories: 1) The mission contributed, and will continue to contribute to 
normalization, 2) The mission may have initially contributed to normalization, but now 
finds itself locked in the specific mission set for which it was assigned, or 3) The mission 
did not make any substantive contributions to normalization.  
An initial observation of Japan’s military response in the Gulf of Aden, 
unprecedented and outside of the construct of the UN, leads me to hypothesize that this 
mission contributed, and will contribute to, expanding the role of the JSDF. As multi-
national operations there continue indefinitely and Japan slowly increases its footprint in 
Djibouti, it is perhaps safe to assume a more dedicated presence that could support any 
number of operations that themselves promote a more normal military. Japan’s 
participation in the UN mission in South Sudan, however, represents a more conventional 
path to normalization that has been utilized in some form or another since the 1990s. This 
leads me to hypothesize that this mission, like all other UN missions, incrementally 
contributes to normalization but that its mission scope limits other opportunities to 
expand the role of the JSDF, thus rendering itself locked into the specific mission set for 
which it was assigned. To explore these hypotheses, we begin with the Gulf of Aden case 
study. 
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IV. CASE STUDY I: GULF OF ADEN
A. AN OVERVIEW OF SOMALIA-BASED PIRACY 
The Horn of Africa, once a relative economic backwater, lies astride the Gulf of 
Aden, a critical maritime energy transport artery in which, according to the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), 3.8 million barrels of crude oil pass through each day, 
making it the world’s 4th busiest maritime chokepoint.74 Djibouti, nestled close to the 
narrow Mandeb Strait that links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, has thus become an 
important and relatively stable beachhead in the region, occupying a strategic location 
that sees 10 percent of the world’s oil exports and 20 percent of its commercial exports 
pass by each year (see Figure 1).75 Piracy is a major concern for Japan and other nations 
that are heavily dependent on sea lanes to ensure their ongoing national prosperity and 
security. In 2007, Japan imported 99.6% of its oil, 100% of its coal, and 96.4% of its 
natural gas, with virtually all of it transported through waters deemed unsafe by the Joint 
War Committee of Lloyds of London.76 Japan’s merchant fleet is also the second largest 
in the world, with 3,751 ships over 1,000 gross tons as of January 1, 2010.77 The number 
of pirate attacks around the Horn of Africa gradually rose until reaching the same levels 
experienced at the height of piracy in Southeast Asia in 2007–08, and then nearly 
doubled again in 2010 (219 attacks total).78 Starting with the attack on the chemical 
tanker Golden Nori off the coast of Somalia in 2008, several Japanese-owned ships were 
hijacked, elevating piracy to a top foreign policy issue in Japan. 
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Figure 1.  The Horn of Africa.79 
The business of piracy in the region demonstrated itself to not only be a viable but 
an especially lucrative enterprise: from 2005 to 2013, pirates were rewarded with average 
annual ransoms of U.S. $53 million.80 Even more incredible was the often overlooked 
U.S. $18 billion in annual increased trade costs associated with insurance requirements, 
altered trade routes, and increased cruising speeds, as well as the U.S. $1 billion to U.S. 
$1.3 billion in annual military costs associated with anti-piracy efforts footed by the 
international community.81 Somalia’s giant scale, almost the length of the entire eastern 
seaboard of the United States, and its porous borders naturally contribute to a lack of 
governance that pirates can exploit. Mogadishu’s continuous effort to build a central 
regime via the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) also runs counter to the 
autonomous, decentralized, fluid, and traditional nature of the Somali clan culture. Clans 
quickly aligned, dissolved, then realigned on numerous occasions to adapt to the rapidly 
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changing political landscape resulting from state collapse in 1991, the subsequent rise 
and fall of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Ethiopian military occupation, and the 
rise of the Islamic insurgency.82 Continuous unrest provided the necessary weapons 
needed for the pirate attacks and a certain moral justification for piracy—from the Somali 
perspective, outside forces had unnecessarily intervened in Somali affairs, as evidenced 
by the sudden pullout of U.S. forces, the subsequent loss of foreign aid, and the 
destruction of the ICU, which led to another violent insurgency. Though other illicit 
trades prospered in the south of Somalia in this environment, the southern region of the 
country was actually too unstable to establish the complex patronage networks needed to 
cash in on piracy. Mogadishu, as well as many of Somalia’s bordering countries, were 
therefore not as concerned with infringements on international trade and perceived the 
threat posed by piracy to be distant in nature. Business links between pirates and officials 
in Puntland, the semi-autonomous region in Northeast Somalia, however, were firmly 
established, and capitalized on this lucrative business while it still remained economically 
viable. Puntland provided the pirates their much-needed free access to the coast, and 
protection against law enforcement officials and competing criminal groups.83 Roger 
Middleton from the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, also recognized 
Puntland’s role in the piracy problem, stating that “Top Puntland officials benefit from 
piracy, even if it might not be instigating it…all significant political actors are likely 
benefiting from piracy.”84 Djibouti, a small but strategically-located country adjacent to 
Somalia, presented a viable base of operations from which they could best address this 
threat. 
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B. THE GULF OF ADEN MISSION 
The Japanese contribution to anti-piracy efforts includes the deployment of two 
JMSDF destroyers and daily patrols by two P-3C aircraft, mainly in the vicinity of the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden. While the 
ships utilize the Djibouti Harbor, a P-3C squadron operates from Japan’s first overseas 
base since World War II, officially entitled the “Japanese Facility for Counter-Piracy 
Mission in Djibouti.”85 This “facility,” whose name implies a short-term presence, is 
semi-permanent in design and located adjacent to the Djibouti International Airport, 
employing roughly two hundred personnel. Japan’s military investment and activities in 
the region distinguish it as being one of the most active countries in the fight against 
Somalia-based piracy, achieving a near-constant sea presence and flying the most 
reconnaissance missions of any other nation.86 As a mission not limited by the scope of 
the UN or any specific mission set, Japan’s operations in Djibouti represent a new and 
unconventional path to normalization while also providing a venue for future operational 
commitments. 
Pressure to intervene in the region first came from the Japanese Shipowners’ 
Association (JSA) in 2006 after it deemed the area a significant threat to Japanese ships 
and crew. Soon afterwards, in 2007, the Golden Nori, a Japanese-owned chemical tanker, 
was hijacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia. Merely expressing a hope that “the 
government would pass legislation to deploy the JMSDF,” the JSA’s proposal was later 
supported by a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) and growing international 
participation in the anti-piracy effort.87 Before any such legislation could be passed, 
however, the constraints imposed on out-of-area missions by Article IX, including an 
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interpretation at the time that limited the right of collective self-defense, had to once 
again be reexamined. In Japan, the Diet must also approve a special law required for each 
proposed mission along with annual votes granting extensions to that mission. The LDP 
soon backed a proposed measure to deploy forces to “keep in step with the international 
society,” with Prime Minister Taro Aso adding that piracy constitutes a crime as opposed 
to an act of war and that “the protection of the Japanese people’s property is the most 
fundamental duty of the government.”88 He also framed the debate in Japan’s larger geo-
political context, indicating that for resource-dependent Japan it was a matter of “life and 
death” and that the region was in the midst of a “dramatic increase” in the number of 
pirate attacks.89 Opposition parties, some of which reject the idea of a self-defense force 
altogether, capitalized on the anti-militarist sentiment generally present in the Japanese 
public to prevent any supposed misuse of military power. At the start of deliberations, 
Mizuho Fukushima, leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), stated that “the 
dispatch could very well induce the first use of armed force overseas by the Self-Defense 
Forces” and that “to allow the dispatch under the circumstances would become a 
precedent that would allow the dispatch of the JSDF anywhere, anytime, at any cost.”90 
Rebuttals such as these from opposition members obliged some government figures who 
had been actively pursuing a greater role for the JSDF to appeal to international 
pressure—by this time, China, South Korea, and eighteen other countries had already 
deployed forces to the area. The Yomiuri Shimbun, a center-right-leaning newspaper, was 
also publishing stories on Japan’s lack of contributions compared to China.  
To analyze the potential for sustained operations in the area while deliberations 
were taking place, a field investigation team consisting of both MOD and JSDF personnel 
visited Bahrain, Djibouti, Oman, and Yemen in February and early March, 2009.91 Soon 
afterward, on March 14, 2009, and before any new laws were passed, two destroyers 
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were deployed to the region. Under Article 82 of the JSDF Law, the deployment of JSDF 
units without prior approval from the Diet is allowed when “special measures are deemed 
necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea.”92 This deployment 
coincided with the establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(CGPCS), making Japan a founding member and granting it significant influence in 
future decision-making. The CGPCS, an international organization established in 2010 by 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and sanctioned by UNSC resolutions, coordinates 
military, policing, legal, and capacity-building efforts among various stakeholders 
participating in the anti-piracy mission.93 As a founding member, Japan is not only an 
active participant in the formation of legal frameworks of other countries in the region, 
but also benefits from international recognition that grants it a measure of legitimacy to 
conduct missions that could easily be construed as violating collective self-defense 
restrictions and other laws limiting military operations. Despite this legitimacy gained 
from CGPCS, Article 82 of the JSDF Law is not intended for long-term operations. To 
the LDP, a permanent law to allow the JMSDF to protect any ship, regardless of 
nationality, was needed to provide the legal foundation for a long-term mission in the 
Gulf of Aden.94 After only one week of debate, the Japanese House of Representatives 
approved such a bill on April 23, 2009, albeit one that authorized non-permanent 
deployments due to opposition pressures within the Lower House. The bill, however, still 
had to be considered by the House of Councillors (the Upper House), which at the time 
was majority-ruled by the opposition party, the DPJ. Despite the subsequent rejection in 
the House of Councilors, the LDP was able to pass the measure in a second vote in the 
House of Representatives in mid-June 2009, authorizing full participation in anti-piracy 
efforts in the Gulf of Aden and essentially allowing the JMSDF to become a fully-
functioning, independent deploying force.95  
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This new measure was Law No. 55, officially entitled the Law on Punishment of 
and Measures against Acts of Piracy or Anti-Piracy Law, and granted the government the 
political, legal, and moral authority to deploy military forces to the affected area.96 As 
opposed to the Japanese Seafarers Laws that only defined “serious marine accidents,” the 
Anti-Piracy Law clearly defined maritime piracy and granted the government the rights 
and responsibilities to protect commercial vessels from this newly-defined threat.97 This 
new legislation also allows Japan to respond better to so-called “gray-zone 
contingencies,” or threatening actions by state or non-state actors.98 By granting the 
JMSDF to take action against supposedly non-state actors to protect foreign ships, 
previously unthinkable, the Anti-Piracy Law would later influence the ability to fully 
exercise collective self-defense in March 2016.99 Incidentally, the new law also allowed 
the JSA and other industry leaders to forge deeper relations with the MOD in the process 
of deliberations, providing an alternate channel to the government aside from its primary 
go-between, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT).100 
Even shortly after the passing of Japan’s Anti-Piracy Law, in December 2013, the 
JMSDF destroyer JS Samidare was granted authorization by the government to join 
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 outside of the IRTC on its anti-piracy patrols.101 
Were it not for the success of the ongoing JCG-led anti-piracy mission in 
Southeast Asia and the legal foundation those operations established to address non-
traditional security threats, the Japanese mission in the Gulf of Aden may not have been 
able to materialize in the first place. As a civilian agency under the MLIT and a non-
military entity according to Article 25 of JCG law, the JCG was a useful medium to 
expand Japan’s influence in Southeast Asia, a region once apprehensive of Japanese-led 
                                                 
96 Walsh, “Kakehashi Trip Report #5.” 
97 Michael Walsh, “Kakehashi Trip Report #3: Shipowner Shares Perspective on Industry Response to 
Somali Piracy,” FAS, last modified February 19, 2014, http://fas.org/blogs/fas/2014/02/kakehashi-trip-
report-3-shipowner-shares-perspective-industry-response-somali-piracy/. 
98 Pryor, “Japan’s Security Policy Under Abe.” 
99 Christopher Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, 88. 
100 Michael Walsh, “Kakehashi Trip Report #5.” 
101 Vosse, “An Independent Deployer in Informal Organizational Structures,” 6. 
 30
security initiatives. Overall, the use of the JCG for anti-piracy missions in Southeast Asia 
showed that it was also capable of testing constitutional limitations, but most relevant 
was the JCG’s involvement in ReCAAP, the world’s first regional organization 
established solely to combat maritime piracy, and a future model for anti-piracy efforts in 
the Gulf of Aden.102 Experience in the implementation of ReCAAP in Southeast Asia, 
including the use of Information Sharing Centers (ISC) to facilitate the distribution of 
information across institutional boundaries, proved highly effective in coordinating 
international efforts. In the case of the CGPCS, these ISCs were located in Sana’a, 
Yemen, Mombasa, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and greatly improved the 
overall effectiveness of the anti-piracy mission.103 
The Gulf of Aden, however, was much farther away from Japan than Southeast 
Asia and presented its own unique challenges and legal considerations. A JCG-only 
deployment, aside from being impractical so far from home waters, is limited by the 
assets it has available to fulfill its numerous mission requirements. Nevertheless, the JCG 
needed to play a central role in the Gulf of Aden because in Japan, piracy is considered a 
criminal offense and therefore a law enforcement issue.104 Therefore, the JMSDF ships 
merely provide support to JCG officers acting under the original Japanese Coast Guard 
Law of 1953.105 Under the Anti-Piracy Law, only JCG officials, and not the JMSDF, 
could use weapons provided the “perpetrator or the ship disobeys other measures to deter 
and continues the acts of piracy and that there is probable cause to believe in the lack of 
any other appropriate measures to stop the navigation of that ship.”106 This authority 
differed from past missions, such as in Japan’s at-sea refueling mission in the Indian 
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Ocean in support of America’s War on Terror and the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2011, in 
that the defense minister, with the approval of the prime minister, now had the power to 
direct JSDF units. Starting in March 2009, JCG personnel operated alongside JMSDF 
cohorts in the Gulf of Aden under the Anti-Piracy Law and Article 80 of the JCG Law, 
which delineated the JCG as a paramilitary force due to the practice of bringing the JCG 
under the Minister of Defense at times of JSDF mobilizations.107 The decision to send the 
JCG and the JSDF in this capacity was supported by opinion polls that showed a 
relatively high general public approval rating of 57 percent in favor of a JSDF response 
in the Gulf of Aden.108  
 
A suspected pirate vessel is located by a Japanese P-3C that then reported the vessel’s 
location to a nearby Danish coalition warship. Gulf of Aden, November 12, 2011. 
Figure 2.  Suspected Pirates in the Gulf of Aden.109 
As a civilian institution, the JCG was also used to provide security training to 
international partners and to export Japanese-made equipment to international law 
enforcement agencies before the reversal of Japan’s self-imposed ban on defense exports, 
including the donation of armed patrol vessels to Indonesia and the Philippines.109 
Similarly, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), a civilian government 
agency, played a key role in circumventing existing limitations on arms exports to bolster 
the security capabilities of various governments, some of which were in Africa. In the 
Japanese sense, arms could refer to military equipment or relatively inconspicuous 
                                                 
107 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, The Adelphi Papers, 39. 
108 Black, “Debating Japan’s Intervention to Tackle Piracy in the Gulf of Aden,” 270. 
109 Hribernik, “Japan Coast Guard (JCG) as a Foreign Policy Instrument in Southeast Asia.” 
 32
components with mainly civilian applications that nevertheless have some type of 
military use, as opposed to complete weapons systems.110 However, inconspicuous 
components such as sensors and aircraft parts are highly marketable and, aside from 
political reasons, important to Japan in increasing its industrial demand and providing 
access to defense-industry partners to utilize economies of scale.111 For much of Japan’s 
post-war history, however, arms exports were banned, given the “Three Principles on 
Arms Exports and Their Related Policy Guidelines” of 1967 and a collateral policy 
guideline in 1976, resulting in Japan’s arms exports’ never reaching any level of 
significance, aside from limited exports of dual-use technologies with China, Southeast 
Asia, and Africa in the 1960s.112 Self-imposed arms restrictions therefore forced Japan to 
develop its own indigenous capabilities just to be able to support the JSDF; however, 
many Japanese companies found it difficult to compete in the international marketplace 
for defense-related equipment, especially when Japan’s defense budgets reached all-time 
lows in the 1990s.113 Subsequently, lawmakers and industrialists sought various ways to 
increase international defense collaboration through the partial or total lifting of the arms 
export ban.  
Some of the methods employed to chip away at the ban included a new 
interpretation by the MOD of a Chief Cabinet Secretary’s Statement of 2004 as 
authorizing joint research and development in anti-terrorism and anti-piracy related 
measures, as well as the export of new and used unarmed patrol craft to various countries, 
mostly in Southeast Asia and Africa.114 Prime Minister Abe also supported the export of 
non-lethal military equipment and the providing of training to civil authorities from 
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various countries near areas affected by piracy. This practice placed the JICA, a 
government agency that normally promotes overseas development, in the somewhat 
awkward position of an intermediary inadvertently supporting external security 
operations. This new role for JICA nevertheless proved useful in opening new markets to 
Japanese arms, including efforts to bolster the Kenyan navy and, in 2013, to provide 
equipment support to a new international customer capable of addressing the piracy 
problem directly: Somalia.115 Similarly, the incorporation of Japan’s security efforts into 
the JICA development aid infrastructure also signified the entrenching of JSDF assets in 
Japan’s institutional framework in Africa.116 JICA was not initially focused on Djibouti, 
but this changed given the establishment of the Japanese facility there and the associated 
government efforts in securing Japan’s vital trade and energy routes through the region.  
The new Japanese facility in Djibouti, costing about U.S. $40 million, was 
established on July 7, 2011; and at its opening ceremony, Akimitsu Ashida, president of 
the JSA, commended it as “a great deterrence against the pirates.”117 Though certainly 
that, it is also an unprecedented move for the Japanese, and can be thought of as a major 
step in the evolution of financial and capacity-building initiatives beginning with the First 
Gulf War, to support for America’s Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, and then the key 
role that the JCG played in ReCAAP in Southeast Asia. Japan’s experience with 
ReCAAP primarily led to its initiation of and significant support toward the international 
trust fund that finances anti-piracy efforts around the Horn of Africa, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) Djibouti Code Trust Fund, otherwise known as the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct. Japan’s initial contribution to the fund in 2011 of U.S. $14.6 
million was by far the single largest amount donated by any country.118 This put Japan in 
a leading role in the financial support of humanitarian, reconstruction, and capacity-
building missions in the area, a position it had grown more and more comfortable with as 
a world leader in foreign aid donations. This role, and its significant financial assistance, 
                                                 
115 Walsh, “Kakehashi Trip Report: JICA Officials Share Perspectives.” 
116 Ibid. 
117 “Japan’s Actions against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.” 
118 Vosse, “An Independent Deployer in Informal Organizational Structures,” 8. 
 34
allowed Japan to become directly involved in such local initiatives as the establishment 
of the Djibouti Regional Training Center (DRTC), with Japan providing U.S. $2.5 
million of the required U.S. $2.628 million in associated costs.119 Japan’s commitment to 
this and other training and enforcement efforts in Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles, and 
Somalia, coupled with ODA projects, has given it a significant voice in the affairs of East 
African states. For Japan, participation in anti-piracy missions and its extensive 
involvement in the institutional framework of the region has become an important 
exercise in joint operations outside of traditional UN peacekeeping operations.120  
C. SOMALIA-BASED PIRACY SINCE 2012 
Starting in 2012, a sharp decrease in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia led 
many international observers to offer a cautious “job well done” for the safeguarding of 
strategic waterways in the area. A number of factors are cited in reducing incidents of 
piracy (“incidents” include vessels pirated, attacked, approached, or disrupted) from 265 
in 2011, to 66 in 2012, 18 in 2013, and only two in 2014.121 These factors include 
international intervention in the form of naval patrols, the use of ship defense measures 
and private armed security teams, and the influence of a more stable Somali central 
government. By 2013, 60% of the vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden, many of 
which were Japanese-owned ships, had armed guards.122 Though the use of armed guards 
had previously been out of the question before the piracy problem arose, revisions in 
2013 to the Japanese Firearms and Swords Control Law, which granted the use of armed 
guards aboard Japanese flagged vessels, was highly influenced by other countries that 
now considered this a generally accepted practice when transiting through the area.123 
The passing of this law was most likely influenced by the increasing usage of security 
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personnel by other CGPCS nations and the 2011 IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct interim 
guidance on this practice.  
Even within Puntland the pirates were facing new threats: though many officials 
there previously tolerated or even enabled piracy in the past, the government began to 
support, at least formally, outside efforts to combat piracy to legitimize its hold on power 
in the semi-autonomous region. The Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), a local 
militia funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) outside of UN sanctions, had its own 
operational successes, intercepting a North Korean vessel illegally dumping in local 
waters, disrupting pirate bases on the ground, and, in December 2012, rescuing twenty-
two foreign sailors on board the vessel, MV Iceberg, from pirates—the first operations of 
their kind in Somalia’s history.124 The recent improvements in maritime security, 
however, have only allowed other nations to exploit Somalia’s territorial seas, mostly 
through illegal fishing, which poses the greatest threat to the livelihoods of many Somalis 
and is one of the main reasons large-scale piracy occurred in the first place. Abdiwahid 
Mohamed Hersi, Chief Executive of Global Sea Food International, a company based in 
Somalia, recognized this consequence by commenting that “If [the foreign navies] have a 
mandate to protect the [shipping] lanes from the pirates, they have to protect the 
resources of these poor people against illegal fishing.”125  
The Puntland government, not to mention the Somalia government, has 
nonetheless turned much of its attention away from piracy to the large oil reserves 
purported to exist in Puntland, and likewise overcoming the UN sanction that formally 
blocks oil exploration there to avoid exacerbating domestic unrest in a country slowly 
recovering from its long civil war. According to the Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute 
for Policy Studies, oil deposits in Puntland and Somaliland may amount to 110 billion 
barrels (Saudi Arabia has 266 billion) prompting a resource race with several foreign 
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companies currently surveying the area.126 The Dharoor and Nugaal faults that run 
directly through Puntland are also estimated to contain roughly 20 billion barrels.127 If 
successfully tapped outside of UN sanctions, however, there is a high probability that oil 
revenues would turn Somalia into the equivalent of other oil-dependent African “narco-
states,” and not the proactive security partner that Japan and other countries are trying to 
mold.128 Nigeria’s dysfunctional oil industry, for example, and the region’s violent 
politics are considered the root cause of the violent grab-and-go style of West African 
piracy. In 2014, the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa accounted for 19% of pirate attacks 
worldwide, considered by some the next piracy “hotspot.”129 For now, it appears that 
Puntland, and Somalia in general, will continue to work with interested partners to 
expand its security infrastructure in order to increase its legitimacy, partly for the purpose 
of gaining control and access to its newfound oil and other natural resource riches.  
The fact that the number of piracy-related incidents off the coast of Somalia has 
nearly reached zero begs the question of why the international security commitment there 
remains so high. From the first UN-authorized naval intervention in 2008, thirty nations 
have participated and twenty-four nations are now actively involved in anti-piracy 
missions. Likewise, there is no shortage of international donor states and organizations 
now flooding into Somalia—the UAE, United Kingdom, Norway, and Japan, as well as 
international organizations such as the European Union, NATO, IMO, and Djibouti Code 
of Conduct, have all indicated a willingness to help Somalia through local capacity-
building efforts, such as the development of its own coastguard.130 On 10 November 
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2015, the UN Security Council (UNSC) reauthorized international naval action against 
piracy around Somalia, claiming that “while the threat from Somali pirates has declined, 
it still remains a matter of grave concern.”131 However, due to the fact that multilateral 
initiatives sponsored by major international institutions are generally inflexible, 
accompanied by specific conditions, and limited in their ability to operate on the ground 
in Somalia, private companies are often the ones to profit most from international 
security initiatives taking place at sea. For example, the Djibouti Code of Conduct and 
the UN Trust Fund for Somalia are well-funded and offer policy recommendations, but 
have yet to offer actual training or procurement solutions within Somalia. NATO’s 
Ocean Shield conducts exercises with Djibouti, Oman, and Yemen, but engagement with 
Somalia remains limited only to humanitarian assistance and consultation. Europe’s 
EUCAP NESTOR is mandated by the UN to assist Somalia directly but was limited to 
only providing coastguard and legal training to Djibouti, Kenya, and the Seychelles since 
2012, though new field offices were recently established in Hargeisa and Mogadishu.132  
Rear Admiral Michael Franken, prior commander of the Combined Joint Task 
Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), stated that “it may take as much as a generation 
before anti-piracy operations will no longer be necessary.”133 Major General Thierry 
Caspar, prior commander of the French forces in Djibouti, recognized that “the answer 
[to comprehensive security in the region] is not on the sea but on the ground.”134 This 
consensus was also shared by Japan’s prior ambassador to Djibouti, Jun Shimmi, who 
indicated that “The reality is that we won’t find a just cause to withdraw for the 
foreseeable future,” adding that “Since there is neither a quick fix nor a panacea, Japan 
has no choice but to continue with our assistance to Somalia as measures to address the 
root cause of the problem.”135 Because the current mission in the Gulf of Aden exists to 
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fight the symptom, not the cause, of piracy, no one will be able to claim victory over 
piracy until the numerous problems that lead to it are resolved on the ground, which is 
unlikely to happen any time soon. The root cause of piracy in Somalia, whether 
recognized as illegal fishing, ongoing conflict, or general poverty, will indeed take many 
years to rectify, allowing Japan and other CGPCS nations to continue their engagement in 
the region and pursue their own interests.  
Likewise, according to a senior official at Japan’s Ministry of Defense, Japan is 
eager to expand the utility of its facility in Djibouti in the near future “based on the 
government’s principle of ‘proactive pacifism,’ [claiming that] it is a natural matter of 
course to develop a strategy to utilize more of the JSDF’s lone foreign operational 
base.”136 This includes the future use of the facility for rescue missions in Africa and the 
Middle East, general emergencies, terrorism-related responses, and to serve as a logistics 
hub—all new capabilities beyond just the anti-piracy effort. This is likely in response to a 
number of Japanese civilians that were killed or injured recently in terrorist incidents in 
the region: one crewmember was injured on board the Japanese tanker M. Star (2010), 
ten engineers were killed in Algeria (2013), three tourists were killed in Tunisia (2015), 
and two reporters were executed in Syria (2015). Though the facility was built on a semi-
permanent basis solely to support anti-piracy operations, the facility will most likely need 
to be expanded or improved to support these new missions. Along these lines, there is a 
strong concern in the government that the significant decrease in pirate attacks may lead 
to the eventual disbandment of the CGPCS altogether.137 Additionally, the increase in 
pirate attacks in West Africa, particularly near oil-rich Nigeria, may potentially shift 
international attention away from Japan’s significant security investments already made 
in East Africa to an area in which Japan has far less stake.138  
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D. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE GULF OF ADEN MISSION 
The Gulf of Aden mission differs markedly from the past JSDF deployment to the 
Middle East in support of coalition forces, Operation Iraqi Freedom. On that mission, the 
JSDF fulfilled strictly support and humanitarian-oriented roles, and the mission was 
assumed to be short-term in the first place, finally being abruptly halted in 2007 when 
government opposition overruled a renewed deployment. On the other hand, considering 
the American withdrawal from Somalia in 1993 during the Somali Civil War, Japan’s 
closest ally will likely be unwilling to again commit forces to an operation within that 
country and therefore strongly supports Japan’s indefinite presence in the region. 
Likewise, the mission’s focus on peace and security, as well as the magic of the word 
“piracy,” makes it much more acceptable to the Japanese government and public. Pirate 
attacks, however, need to be kept in perspective: though damaging, pirate attacks affect 
only a tiny fraction of worldwide shipping, while it remains difficult for Japanese ships 
and planes to intervene and stop an actual attack before it takes place. Nevertheless, the 
piracy problem, Japan’s desire to increase its international commitments, and the strength 
of the ruling coalition were sufficient to influence the passing of several new laws that 
further reinterpreted the constitution and allowed Japan to become a major player in the 
region. This newfound “responsibility to protect” has essentially given Japan the legal 
right to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states and has moved the country into a new 
era of greater self-reliance. 
Japan’s facility in Djibouti is indispensable to Japan’s continued efforts to expand 
its operational capabilities and display this greater self-reliance in Africa. In October 
2013, Japan decided to increase the number of JSDF attachés/intelligence officers in 
Africa from two to nine, one of which is stationed in Djibouti, to better respond to crises 
in the region.139 As the position in Djibouti is not directly related to the anti-piracy 
mission, this suggests an intention to continue operating the base despite the lack of 
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pirate activity.140 Japan’s successful anti-piracy operations afford it the opportunity to 
non-confrontationally demonstrate its expanding military capabilities in a somewhat 
regulated environment, but even this has begun to evolve. The Ministry of Defense 
recently decided that P-3C aircraft returning from anti-piracy missions off the coast of 
Somalia will favor refueling stops in countries bordering the South China Sea, 
particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, as opposed to its previous stops in such 
countries as Singapore and Thailand.141 Recent high-level visits by the Defense Minister 
in May 2014 and January 2015 and by the Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense in 
May 2015 to Djibouti indicate that the security institution of Japan will still play a big 
part in the region. 
Japan’s contributions to the Gulf of Aden mission undoubtedly had a ‘boomerang 
effect’ on Japanese policy-making, making it easier for security-related initiatives to 
materialize.142 These include the establishment of a new NSC in 2013, a new Dynamic 
Joint Defense Force doctrine, a gradual increase in defense spending, the relatively 
assertive defense policy outlined in both the National Defense Program Guidelines and 
the Five-year Defense Program for 2014 through 2018, and finally the June 2014 decision 
to allow the use of collective-defense measures. The anti-piracy mission also played a 
significant role in challenging long-held beliefs in Japanese society regarding the use of 
weapons in self-defense. More generally, Japan’s operations in the Gulf of Aden have 
influenced domestic policy-making, laws concerning the deployment of its military 
forces, the enhancement of JSDF and JCG capabilities, and altered prior interpretations of 
the peace constitution.143 Some who wished to preserve Japan’s image as a peace-loving 
nation yet also supported JSDF deployments pointed out that constitutional 
reinterpretation was necessary in this case as it emphasized the building of civilian law 
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enforcement (through the JCG) and presents a non-conventional alternative (a military 
force under strict regulations) for other states to adapt.  
E. THE CHINA FACTOR—PULLING NORMALIZATION FROM THE 
OUTSIDE? 
In the last part of the Gulf of Aden case study, I will explore China’s economic 
and military activities in Djibouti in relation to its larger strategy in Africa, providing an 
idea of how Japan’s main rival could be prompting Japan’s own military normalization. 
Japan’s operations in Djibouti are of keen interest to China, itself a country with limited 
experience in executing overseas military operations and interested in the idea of utilizing 
anti-piracy and counterterrorism missions as justification for a military presence 
relatively safe from international criticism.144 As with Japan, China’s military activities 
in the Gulf of Aden, starting in 2008, have, according to U.S. Army General David 
Rodriquez, granted it “a more confident blue-water navy and given China a strategic win 
in a venue outside its traditional comfort zone.”145 No stranger to Japan’s legal 
reinterpretations on the use of its military force, China has created new national security 
and antiterrorism laws which, according to the officer in charge of the Central Military 
Commission’s Legal Affairs Bureau, allow it to “[carry] out UN-led peacekeeping 
operations, international disaster relief, maritime escorts, and military operations to 
protect China’s overseas interests.”146 Essentially, these laws authorize the deployment 
of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) assets 
overseas to protect Chinese assets and personnel abroad.147 Furthermore, China’s “Arab 
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Policy Paper,” released in December 2015, emphasizes the importance of close military 
and counterterrorism cooperation with its regional partners.148 
China, like Japan, is also interested in bolstering its presence in Djibouti to 
provide the necessary capabilities to safeguard its citizens living and working in the 
region and to respond to nontraditional threats. For example, China employed its naval 
forces to evacuate 35,680 of its citizens from Libya in 2011, and later utilized Djibouti’s 
port facilities when it evacuated 629 Chinese and other foreign nationals during Saudi 
Arabia-led coalition airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen in March 2015, soon 
after the China-Djibouti defense agreement was signed.149 The growing number of 
Chinese workers in Africa, currently about one million, highlights its desire to establish 
regional facilities to better support non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), among 
other capabilities.150 Chinese workers have also been the target of terrorist attacks such 
as the one that took place in Bamako, Mali, in November 2015, killing three engineering 
executives, and the execution of a Chinese citizen by the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State.151 An increased military presence to respond to these threats will also allow China 
to better exert its influence in the region, such as through its participation in naval 
exercises with Russia in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 using the same ships that took 
part in its Gulf of Aden anti-piracy patrols.152  
A relative latecomer to Djibouti, China gained military to access to the country in 
2014 when Djiboutian Defense Minister Hassan Darar Houffaneh signed a defense 
agreement with Chinese Minister of National Defense General Chang Wanquan.153 In 
exchange, Defense Minister Houffaneh asked for military hardware to “safeguard 
security in the country and help consolidate peace and security in the sub-region,” for 
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which China donated one of its domestically-built MA-60 turboprop airplanes and one of 
its WZ551 armored personnel carriers a mere four months later.154 In early November 
2015, General Fang Fenghui, Director of the PLA’s General Staff Department and 
therefore the PLA’s top operations officer, visited Djibouti to negotiate the establishment 
of a Chinese base to be constructed in Obock, an isolated coastal town in the northern 
part of the country (see Figure 2). In a symbolic gesture, President Guelleh granted 
permission to this request just one day after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s own 
unprecedented visit, also commenting on the Japanese effort by bluntly saying that “the 
Japanese want to protect themselves from piracy—and now the Chinese also want to 
protect their interests.”155 As the United States is paying U.S. $63 million annually to 
rent the land on which Camp Lemonnier stands compared to the projected rent for the 
Chinese base of U.S. $100 million, Djibouti has much to gain from serving as the host to 
global power rivalries.156  
 
Figure 3.  Djibouti.157 
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When granting permission to the Chinese request, President Guelleh also made it 
clear that “The Djibouti government will always adhere to the ‘one-China’ principle” and 
remain friends.158 The willingness of African leaders to entertain China’s aims of 
diplomatically isolating Taiwan, including South Africa’s recent recognition of Beijing’s 
sovereignty over the island, provides strong evidence of China’s current political clout in 
the region—currently, only eight out of fifty-three nations in Africa officially recognize 
the Taipei government.159 Africa’s willingness to appease Chinese interests is not 
entirely new—many African elites were hesitant to overtly criticize Beijing after the 
Tiananmen Square incident and likewise displayed suspicion of the Western world’s 
response given the large amount of Chinese aid received. China, more willing to 
capitalize on this political tool immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident, 
scrambled to win over even more allies by increasing its overseas aid from U.S. $223.4 
million in 1989 to U.S. $374.6 million in 1990.160 Having more support across Africa 
also means that China can better resist Western minority pressures in international 
organizations, such as the UN.161  
Unconstrained by constitutional limitations, China has placed an increased 
emphasis on securing its growing overseas interests. According to its bi-annual defense 
paper (China’s Military Strategy, released May 2015), its armed forces “will actively 
participate in both regional and international security cooperation and effectively secure 
China’s overseas interests,” and “China’s armed forces will work harder to create a 
favorable strategic posture with more emphasis on the employment of military forces and 
means.”162 In January 2016, the PLA conducted an exercise involving thousands of 
marines and special-operations personnel in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 
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an area similar to the terrain of much of North and East Africa, suggesting preparations 
for future contingency operations in Africa.163 Most of all, China’s new base and its 
associated increased military presence forces other countries to seriously consider 
China’s presence on the continent, something that, according to some Chinese 
commentators, did not happen when England, France, and the United States stepped 
outside of the UN construct in Libya and allowed the destruction of U.S. $1 billion in 
Chinese assets.164  
In 2011, China’s investment on the continent reached U.S. $3.17 billion, 
compared to Japan’s U.S. $460 million, according to the Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) and Chinese trade data.165 Likewise, Africa’s markets have seen 
U.S. $90 billion in Chinese investments alone between 2000 and 2013, and are estimated 
to reach an incredible U.S. $400 billion total by 2020.166 Though bilateral trade between 
China and Djibouti only amounts to about U.S. $200 million per year (though greater 
than the U.S. $10 million in bilateral trade between Japan and Djibouti), Chinese 
investment in Djibouti’s infrastructure since 2015 has reached roughly U.S. $14 billion as 
China attempts to ensure better access to Africa’s bigger markets.167 Djibouti’s local 
interests have been met in part by China’s construction of its presidential palace, its main 
administration building, a national war memorial, a stadium, and two sports complexes. 
More noteworthy development was achieved, however, when two companies—China 
Railway Group (CREC) and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation 
(CCECC)—successfully restored rail service between Djibouti and Merebe Mermersa, 
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south of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2015.168 As 70 percent of landlocked 
Ethiopia’s total trade was previously transported to the Port of Djibouti using trucks, the 
rail link is a welcome sight to both Chinese and local interests. The Doraleh Container 
Terminal, outside of Djibouti City, handles three million Twenty-foot Equivalent Units 
(TEU) of cargo per year with its 18-meter draft and 1,050 quay, giving it one of the 
highest capacities of all of East Africa. China Merchant Holdings (International), the port 
operations division of China Merchants Group, acquired two-thirds of this container 
terminal for U.S. $590 million and a 23.5 percent stake in the Port of Djibouti for 
approximately U.S. $185 million.169 As Chinese influence grows in Djibouti, it is only 
natural that its ability to influence the country’s decision-making will grow along with it. 
According to Japan’s NSS, Japan seeks to construct a “mutually beneficial 
relationship [with China] based on common strategic interests” and encourages China to 
“play a responsible and constructive role for peace, stability, and prosperity.”170 It will 
indeed be a challenge to find common strategic interests in the region that both countries 
can share. China’s recent basing initiative in Djibouti, which will be its first permanent 
base in the Indian Ocean, will go well beyond a convenient place to berth ships 
conducting anti-piracy missions, and instead signifies a turning point in China’s overall 
strategy—one that is increasingly sidelining Japan, still seen as mainly a donor state, and 
other economic competitors in the region. This has already taken place on the economic 
front, with Japan-Africa trade doubling from 2001 to 2009 but Chinese trade expanding 
nearly 1000 percent in the same time.171 In 2011, China’s investment was about seven 
times that of Japan, while Chinese exports to Africa were about five times greater.172 
With further dredging and construction, the port facility at Obock, already improved with 
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prior American investment, can grant China exclusive access to a proposed airstrip and 
provide an alternate access point to African trade. According to U.S. Army General 
David Rodriquez, Commander of U.S. Africa Command, China’s desire for “long-term 
military access at a quasi-base level is a massive about-face,” while Djibouti is “helping 
to catalyze a potentially significant symbolic and substantive shift in China’s foreign 
security policy.”173 Once a relatively obscure country, Djibouti may prove to be a vital 
link to Xi Jinping’s signature maritime “silk road” and an enabler of China’s Middle East 
policy as it seeks to attain superpower status in the security realm.174  
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V. CASE STUDY II: PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTH SUDAN 
A. JAPAN AND PEACEKEEPING 
The U.S.-Japan security alliance formulated in the 1950s and Japan’s pacifist 
norms granted Japan a security umbrella under which it could concentrate on its postwar 
economic recovery, but would leave it with limited means to gain international political 
stature commensurate with its growing economic strength.175 Japan eventually chose the 
UN to achieve this goal, an internationally sanctioned organization that would take center 
stage in Japan’s continued diplomatic efforts to regain the world’s trust. Starting in the 
early post-Cold War period, Prime Minister Nakasone and other revisionists realized that 
Japan’s “narrowly-defined security policy was incongruent with the new security culture 
of the early post-Cold War period.”176 As early as 1980, a special study group to the 
MOFA suggested that the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) operation in 
Namibia, with its absence of hostilities, would allow Japan to “play a more positive and 
broader-ranging role in peacekeeping operations.”177 The nature of the mission, limited 
to monitoring elections, also fit into Japan’s promotion of liberal democratic norms.178 It 
was not until 1989 that thirty-one Japanese electoral observers were actually sent in-
country, but this opened Africa up to new possibilities for Japanese engagement. Since 
UNTAG, Japan has utilized UN peacekeeping missions to include the JSDF in roles not 
usually associated with military operations in order to slowly expand the scope of their 
operations to address non-contemporary threats.179  
Increased political pressure to find ways to normalize the JSDF in the 1990s 
resulted in an apparent regime shift in Japanese politics which to revisionists, 
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peacekeeping was seen as the most appropriate and least controversial method of 
international engagement that allowed it to send its military forces overseas. In 1991, 
JMSDF minesweepers were dispatched to the Persian Gulf in support of the American-
led mission, Operation Desert Storm. The next year, the Law Concerning Cooperation for 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (also known as the 
International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL)) opened the door to JSDF involvement, not 
merely observation, in UN peacekeeping operations starting in Cambodia in 1992. In 
Angola, three Japanese election observers monitored presidential and legislative elections 
held there in 1992 as part of the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II). From 
1993 to 1995, Japan dispatched roughly 150 personnel to Mozambique to serve as staff 
officers, logistics specialists, and electoral observers in what would be Japan’s third 
overall UN mission, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Though the mission 
in Mozambique attracted less public attention than Japan’s unprecedented use of JSDF 
forces in the UN mission in Cambodia a short time earlier, Japan’s next African UN 
mission in the eastern part of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) proved to 
be more difficult and potentially dangerous. This mission utilized elements of the GSDF 
in providing medical services, road construction, and logistics expertise as part of Japan’s 
first humanitarian relief operation in aiding refugees fleeing from genocide in 
neighboring Rwanda. Japanese personnel returned to the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo in 2006, when it contributed thirteen election observers to presidential and 
legislative elections taking place in Kinshasa and later provided similar electoral support 
in Burundi and Tanzania. Accumulating a total of thirty-six separate missions since 
passage of the IPCL, Japan has been directly involved in fourteen UN peacekeeping 
missions (with four in Africa), five humanitarian relief missions (with one in Africa), and 
nine election observing missions (with two in Africa) as well as the providing of material 
support to others (see Table 1).180  
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Table 1.   Japan’s UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, Post-IPCL.181 
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Prime Minister Abe and other revisionists have been successful in capitalizing on 
the international norm of burden-sharing to increasingly utilize military intervention to 
pursue global peace and gain more relevance in international affairs.182 UN peacekeeping 
operations remain one of the primary tools used not just by Japan but by the global 
community to promote and maintain peace in Africa, a continent that experiences 88 
percent of conflict-related deaths worldwide.183 Though none of these conflicts had ever 
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posed a direct security threat to Japan, its deliberate use of a UN-centered diplomacy in 
Africa has largely succeeded in garnering economic and political influence and provided 
leverage to support its larger foreign policy goals. Japan’s recent UN peacekeeping 
contributions to the African continent, however, should be kept in perspective. Between 
2000 and 2010, only 3 percent of Japan’s total number of personnel embedded in 
peacekeeping operations were in Africa, the majority being sent instead to Central and 
Southeast Asia.184 At the same time, 73 percent of the total deployed UN military 
personnel from various nations were in Africa. In 2009, only thirty JSDF personnel out of 
a total force of roughly 240,000 personnel were deployed on UN peacekeeping missions, 
as U.S.-led or UN-authorized coalition-type missions received the most attention at the 
time.185 Though Japan’s current significant participation in the UN Mission in the 
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) suggests a refocus of attention toward Africa in this 
regard, its minimal participation in its prior missions left it open to international criticism, 
with accusations of a strategy more focused on leveraging international prestige than one 
that was focused on actually achieving peace and security. This general criticism of its 
limited engagement, by virtue of its legal roadblocks and unwillingness to put its 
personnel in harm’s way, especially in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
also placed Japan’s underlying motives of internationalization and military normalization 
under review as potentially compromising more effective engagement and achievement 
of sustainable peace.  
Over time, however, Japanese peacekeeping missions have gradually increased, 
become more complex, and covered a broader geographical area, in addition to shifting 
from places where conflict has ceased to where conflict is ongoing, such as in South 
Sudan.186 This reflects a general trend in UN peacekeeping missions around the world, 
which have evolved from more traditional and neutral-oriented missions of supervising 
ceasefires and troop withdrawals to more intrusive ones, such as those involved in 
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disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, nation-building, 
and the protection of civilians in conflict areas through the use of restrained force.187 
Though UN missions were becoming more dangerous, some in Japanese political circles 
were hesitant to change the country’s principle of neutrality and impartiality and 
continued to insist on the presence of a ceasefire agreement between parties, as stipulated 
in the original interpretation of the IPCL, indicating a potential unwillingness to continue 
Japan’s UN-centered diplomacy. Likewise, attention focused more on the legality of the 
JSDF’s use of weapons, potential rescue missions, and the associated risk to JSDF 
personnel, not necessarily in meeting the needs of modern UN peacekeeping operations. 
Aside from self-imposed legal restrictions, there was also the fear of harsh criticism that 
would surely arise should a JSDF member get hurt or killed. 
Partly to keep pace with the evolving nature of UN missions, on September 19, 
2015, the government approved the Legislation for Peace and Security, establishing a 
legal basis for Japanese troops to better act on their own discretion and the ability to 
provide the necessary military response to protect the lives of its citizens.188 Most 
notably, it authorizes participation in a wider range of peacekeeping operations and 
internationally-coordinated efforts, permits logistics support in instances deemed 
threatening to Japan’s peace and security, and allows Japan to exercise its right of 
collective self-defense, provided its “Three New Conditions” are met.189 The legislation 
also clarifies Prime Minister Abe’s new concept of “proactive force” in the protection of 
civilians and military personnel while performing non-combat related duties. Japan’s first 
NSS of December 2013, a document from which the Legislation for Peace and Security 
was derived, likewise recognized the evolving nature of UN security missions and 
indicated that Japan will continue to be an active contributor to peace and stability 
through its ongoing participation in UN missions, capacity building assistance, and its 
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promotion of ODA funds.190 This has translated into expanded roles for JSDF officials, 
including as UN peacekeeping operation commanders and the utilization of JSDF troops 
in planning, coordination, and intelligence. By indicating its willingness to contribute to 
and participate in ever more dangerous UN missions, Japan appears ready to make 
increased contributions to world peace and security while in turn loosening self-imposed 
restrictions on its JSDF personnel, not just building up an already long track record of 
UN peacekeeping successes.  
Japan’s current distinction of being the second largest financial contributor to the 
overall UN peacekeeping operations budget (10.83 percent), only behind the United 
States (28.38 percent), clearly indicates it is not abandoning a UN-centric foreign policy 
agenda.191 A key reason for this activism revolves around its desire to attain a permanent 
seat on the UNSC as many African nations hold voting power in the UN General 
Assembly.192 A permanent seat would grant Japan veto rights and allow it to better 
control how its peacekeeping personnel, mostly members of the JSDF, are utilized. Japan, 
along with Brazil, has spent more time on the UNSC as a non-permanent member than 
any other country after first being elected to the council in 1958—Prime Minister Abe 
has used this fact to argue that Japan, as well as Brazil, Germany, and India, should also 
be granted permanent seats.193 By 1991, Japan had sat on the UNSC seven times as a 
non-permanent member, more than any other country, thanks in part to the backing of 
influential African states that in many cases had received Japanese aid.194 Japan’s desire 
for “UNSC reform” (referring to it being granted a permanent seat), as called for in its 
NSS, faces its biggest obstacle from China, itself a permanent member with the ability to 
exercise full veto power. Though it rarely exercises its veto power on issues deemed not 
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directly related to Chinese interests, Japan’s bid would likely be seen as threatening to 
Beijing and would probably result in China blocking the proposal. The sensitive nature of 
Japanese security matters in relation to China, as well as a general Chinese distrust of 
Prime Minister Abe, likely means that Japan will have to settle for a non-permanent seat 
for some time to come.  
B. THE SOUTH SUDAN MISSION 
Recently gaining its independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011, after a long civil 
war, South Sudan lies at a strategic crossroads of Africa. Following a brief moment of 
peace in the world’s youngest nation, political infighting and a coup attempt against 
President Salva Kiir by former Vice President Riek Machar led to renewed violence in 
December 2013, increasingly along Dinka and Nuer ethnic lines, and created a 
humanitarian disaster in its wake. Conditions further deteriorated in April 2015, when 
government forces launched an offensive in the oil-rich Upper Nile region, killing or 
displacing thousands of civilians and perpetuating today’s ongoing conflict for a 
monopoly on access to revenue streams created from its promising natural resources. 
Japan’s involvement in the region began when two liaison officers were sent to 
the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) headquarters in Khartoum in 2008 to explore a 
dedicated Japanese presence in the South.195 South Sudan’s independence immediately 
led to the UNSC’s establishment of UNMISS on July 8, 2011, aimed primarily at nation-
building efforts, while that same year JSDF personnel conducted field visits to South 
Sudan to evaluate security concerns and lay the groundwork for a larger JSDF presence. 
Initially adopting a “wait and see” approach following the triple-disaster in Fukushima, 
the dispatch of JSDF troops to South Sudan was the second time Japan participated in a 
UN peacekeeping operation under a DPJ-led administration, the first being in Haiti in 
2010.196 A gradually increasing number of Japanese personnel have participated in 
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UNMISS, currently reaching upward of 350 staff, engineering, and National Support 
Element (NSE) personnel in various construction projects in support of UN nation-
building efforts. Many of the projects are used to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, such as roads and a river port project completed in May 2015, in cooperation 
with JICA at a cost of U.S. $27.7 million.197 Infrastructure development projects such as 
these are usually assigned to the JSDF by the UN, but local coordination units also 
frequently coordinate with JICA and other Japanese humanitarian organizations.198 
Japanese personnel primarily work out of the capital city of Juba, also the location of 
UNMISS Headquarters and the Japanese Embassy, on a year-by-year rotational basis and 
have worked alongside members in varying capacities from at least sixty three other 
countries in the UN’s third largest mission.199 Additionally, a contingent force was 
established in neighboring Uganda, also Kenya when needed, to handle logistics support 
(see Figure 3). 
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Figure 4.  South Sudan.200 
C. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND CHINESE OIL INTERESTS 
Beyond the scope of advantages offered to it by the UN, South Sudan itself offers 
much in terms of natural resources, including one of Africa’s few sources of crude 
petroleum, drawing possible connections to Japan’s selective engagements in other 
resource-rich African countries. The inaccessibility of these resources, the lack of a 
developed industrial base, and ongoing violence among other factors, however, results in 
South Sudanese exports’ representing just a tiny fraction of Japan’s total imports. This is 
not the case for Japan’s rival, China, which receives over 80 percent of South Sudan’s oil 
exports, distinguishing China as having a unique interest in the country relative to other 
extra-regional states.201 China’s involvement in the Sudanese oil market accelerated after 
UNSCR 1564 was imposed on Sudan for atrocities committed in the Darfur region, 
leaving other countries unwilling to invest in this highly unstable region.202 Ongoing 
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conflict, however, has resulted in oil production from China’s facilities, now mostly 
located in South Sudan, dropping from 245,000 barrels per day in 2013 to 163,000 
barrels per day in 2015, leading Ma Qiang, the Chinese ambassador to South Sudan, to 
state that “We have huge interests in South Sudan so we have to make a greater effort to 
persuade the two sides to stop fighting and agree to a ceasefire.”203 China’s greater effort 
came in the form of seven hundred additional troops to the UNMISS mission—relatively 
significant considering that this is triple the amount of troops previously stationed in 
South Sudan, that China only began sending a limited number of troops as soon as 2013, 
and that these troops are engaged in inherently dangerous patrol and security-related 
duties.204 China’s own UN-centric approach to securing its investments in South Sudan 
differs markedly from its previous strategy of arming the South Sudan government with 
roughly U.S. $20 million in weapons—fully legal, however controversial, given the lack 
of an arms embargo.205 Today, China is taking part in several UN missions in Africa, 
including ones in Congo, Liberia, and Sudan, employing roughly 1,800 troops in total.206 
China’s involvement in the South Sudanese oil industry and its utilization of 
Sudan to transport this oil affords China key advantages in future oil extraction efforts in 
the region, assuming a reasonable level of peace can be achieved. A proposed pipeline 
from Juba to Lamu, Kenya, however, could undermine this arrangement and open South 
Sudan’s oil to greater international competition, in turn altering the geo-political 
dynamics of East Africa (see Figure 4). With cost estimates ranging from U.S. $4 billion 
to U.S. $16 billion, no agreement for such a pipeline has been implemented to date, only 
a Memorandum of Agreement (MoU) that was signed by heads of state from Ethiopia, 
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Kenya, and South Sudan.207 One of the companies that reportedly bid on this project, 
according to the Sudan Tribune, was Toyota Motor Corporation, though the bidding price 
was not disclosed.208 In any case, Kenya’s fortuitous location at a key juncture of East 
African development has likewise afforded it a high level of interest from China, Japan 
and the United States. 
 
Figure 5.  Proposed Pipeline from Juba, South Sudan, to Lamu, Kenya.209 
D. UNMISS AND NORMALIZATION 
Whether Japan’s intentions in South Sudan are to reengage Africa for the purpose 
of economic access or to counter a growing Chinese presence in the region, involvement 
in UNMISS helps to highlight Japan’s continued contributions to the international 
community, indicates Japan’s desire to establish itself within the confines of the UN 
framework as a reliable partner, and signifies a desire to undertake an incremental 
expansion of its force capabilities. As the protection of civilians is a central tenet of the 
UNMISS mandate, the JSDF mission there provided useful justification for Japan’s 
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newfound ability to exercise collective self-defense in this and future missions.210 Also, 
as one of the most dangerous missions Japan has participated in to-date, Japan’s 
acceptance of risk to its JSDF personnel is greater than ever-escalating violence prompted 
the UN Security Council to double the number of total peacekeepers in South Sudan to 
13,000 troops and 2,001 police in December 15, 2015.211 The sharp increase in violence 
in recent years and the ongoing threats to civilians and UN personnel, resulting in the 
total deaths of twenty-one UN troops, one military observer, and two police officials, 
obviously present a direct challenge to Japan’s prior hesitation on its use of force.212 
Additionally, between 2004 and 2014, there were twenty-two notable incidents of losses 
of weapons stockpiles from UN convoys, patrols, and fixed sites.213 Ever since Atsuhito 
Nakata, a Japanese UN volunteer, was killed taking part in the UN mission in Cambodia, 
Japan has been especially mindful of the security of its personnel serving in UN missions, 
though it is important to note that the mission there was continued and the mission in 
Mozambique was approved shortly thereafter.214  
Prime Minister Abe’s announcement at the UN General Assembly of an increased 
troop presence in South Sudan in 2013 indicates a new level of resolve to the UN mission 
and a continued evolution of the security roles of the JSDF, a process that has occurred 
across political lines since the start of UNMISS.215 With his added “proactive 
contribution to peace” agenda, Prime Minister Abe likely has no intention of limiting this 
dual-party political leverage to push military normalization. There are limitations, 
however, to the speed at which Japan can pursue these efforts. In 2014, the UN requested 
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that the Japanese government provide an officer to assume the role as chief-of-staff of 
UN peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. The MOD agreed, however, Japan’s 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau prevented this from happening as the UN Peacekeeping 
Activities Cooperation Law did not explicitly allow Japan to protect others in their 
care.216 Nevertheless, the implementation of Japan’s new collective self-defense laws in 
March 2016, which essentially mean that Japan can come to the aid of other countries’ 
troops or UN personnel in line with their expanding missions, was very influential in 
legitimizing a Japanese presence in South Sudan that will last at least until October 2016, 
following the UNSC’s decision to extend the mandate of UNMISS until the end of July. 
Given Japan’s new security posture as a result of the passing of the collective self-
defense laws, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani stated simply that “JSDF personnel need to 
do training and enhance their capability in a bid to fulfill their duty.”217 Prime Minister 
Abe, on the other hand, indicated during a House of Representatives Budget Committee 
session that “Since the legislation has been passed, we are thinking of assigning (the 
GSDF personnel to new) duties. It requires a great deal of preparation and training.”218 
As of February 2016, the government was still deciding on how to use their newfound 
roles in the larger security context, appearing to delay this discussion until at least 
November to avoid controversy in the House of Councilors election this summer.219 For 
now, by just demonstrating the JSDF’s superior performance in expanding roles, the 
MOD hopes to achieve trust within the UN and state-building organizations.220 
UNMISS also presented a key opportunity to challenge Japan’s original arms 
export ban when, in 2013, Prime Minister Abe received a request through the UN to 
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resupply South Korean peacekeepers in South Sudan with 10,000 rounds of ammunition. 
At the time, the security situation was deteriorating so rapidly that the lives of roughly 
three hundred South Korean forces and numerous other refugees were potentially at 
stake. Interestingly, the bullets carried by the JSDF in South Sudan happened to be the 
only ones compatible with the weapons that the South Korean forces were using there. 
The Abe administration determined that within the context of the UNMISS mission, the 
nature of the crisis necessitated immediate action and therefore lie outside of the “old” 
Three Principles, though based on strict conditions of use.221 The exchange commenced, 
only to later be derailed by diplomatic posturing from various political figures that 
objected to Korea’s supposed tacit consent of Abe’s expanded role of the JSDF, resulting 
in all ammunition’s being returned to the JSDF. The fact that Japan’s NSC circumvented 
the ban and created a new interpretation for the Peace Cooperation Law in the first place, 
however, indicated a willingness to create new precedents on Japan’s handling of arms. 
At the same time, however, it showed that the ability to promote military normalization 
through peacekeeping operations had its political limitations.222  
The handover of ammunition to the South Koreans in South Sudan, however 
controversial, encouraged Prime Minister Abe’s efforts to achieve collective defense and 
arms export reform. On April 1, 2014, in conjunction with Japan’s NSS of December 17, 
2013, the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” was 
introduced, establishing a new set of principles on arms exports, despite a 66 percent 
level of public opposition to such an amendment.223 The “new” Three Principles expands 
the number of cases in which exports of arms are authorized to a total of eleven, boosts 
the domestic defense industry through sales of equipment, and better allows Japan to 
increase its participation in joint development projects with the United States and other 
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partners. Industrial ties with the United States may be the real prize—the first agreement 
utilizing the new principles allowed third party sales of American and Japanese SM-3 
Block IIA ballistic missile interceptor technology—but the door has opened wide to other 
potential markets around the world. The Japanese government, intent on securing its 
interests at home and abroad, sees dual utility in closer relations with all of its potential 
customers and a stronger and more sustainable defense industrial backbone as outlined in 
its NSS. Since the new principles were implemented, other political initiatives have also 
boosted industrial demand, such as the bilateral accords which allowed the Philippines 
and Vietnam to receive defense-related equipment intended to protect against Chinese 
claims in the South China Sea.224  
Given the lifting of arms export restrictions, it is unclear, however, if growth in 
the Japanese arms industry is sustainable. According to Yuzo Murayama, a professor and 
defense expert at Doshisha Business School in Kyoto, “People outside Japan think that 
Japan is really opening up its defense industry…it’s not true. This will take a long 
time.”225 Japan is still not included in many weapons-development ventures required to 
produce complex and expensive weapons systems, meaning that as long as production 
remains limited, Japan will need to pay two to three times what other countries pay for 
similar weapons.226 Though obstacles to selling weapons systems and components 
remain, even in a saturated niche market for non-lethal equipment, Africa represents an 
arms market too big to ignore. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), military expenditures on the continent have grown by an amazing 65 
percent from 2004 to 2013, increasing by 8.3 percent in 2013 alone (see Figure 5).227 
These figures alone represent numerous potential opportunities for which Japan can 
export its peace and security to achieve a viable arms export industrial base for its JSDF. 
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Military spending in Africa has surpassed that of any other continent. 
Figure 6.  Percentage Change in Military Spending (2004–2013).228 
Japan’s utilization of the UN to promote its soft-power strategy in Africa has not 
been without its challenges, but it has allowed Japan to slowly evolve from observation 
missions to ones that demand more than ever from the Japanese military establishment, 
while allowing it to overcome its own constitutional limitations that would have 
otherwise never happened at home.229 As Japan’s chief guarantor of peace, the United 
States is also pressuring the Abe administration to allocate more of its resources to 
peacekeeping missions. In 2014, President Barack Obama asked Prime Minister Abe 
directly to take a more active role in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa as a way to 
limit terrorist activity on the continent.230 Though the JSDF is currently only involved in 
one of the UN missions out of the nine in Africa, American pressure and Prime Minister 
Abe’s insistence that Japan will be more engaged in global peace and stability may bring 
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the JSDF to new parts of the continent. Continued success in future UN peacekeeping 
missions will likely increase the prestige of the JSDF and indicate an additional step 
toward a more autonomous Japan in which the legitimacy of the JSDF is not questioned. 
In this light, Japan’s participation in UNMISS suggests not only a reemergence of its 
UN-centered diplomacy in Africa, but one that promises unprecedented engagement 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
A. THREE OUTCOMES AND ASSOCIATED CONCLUSIONS 
Prior to presenting the case studies, I stated that in each case, we should see either 
that 1) the mission contributed, and will continue to contribute to normalization, 2) the 
mission may have initially contributed to normalization, but now finds itself locked in the 
specific mission set for which it was assigned, or 3) the mission did not make any 
substantive contributions to normalization. In regards to the Gulf of Aden mission, I 
hypothesized that the mission contributed, and will contribute to normalization; based on 
the research presented, I believe that this is indeed the case. As a Japanese mission 
outside of the traditional UN framework, new laws and interpretations to expand the role 
of the JSDF were instrumental in Japan’s participation in the anti-piracy mission, and 
included several “firsts” in Japan’s post-war history. This was the first time that the 
JMSDF worked directly with the JCG under the Anti-Piracy Law and Article 80 of the 
JCG Law. This was the first time that Article 82 of the JSDF Law was used to permit the 
deployment of JSDF units prior to approval from the Diet. After the new Anti-Piracy 
Law was ratified, authorizing full participation in anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden 
and essentially allowing the JMSDF to become a fully-functioning, independent 
deploying force, approval of collective self-defense measures, likely influenced by this 
mission, enabled the JSDF to act more as a normal military in grey zone scenarios. 
Furthermore, Japanese ships transiting the area benefited from revisions to the Japanese 
Firearms and Swords Control Law, which granted the use of armed guards aboard 
Japanese flagged vessels. Though the practice began in Southeast Asia, the 
circumvention of arms export laws by the JCG and JICA in various African countries led 
to the eventual loosening of arms export restrictions, providing a potential boost to a 
more normal Japanese defense establishment. As a founding member of the CGPCS, 
Japan is also in a strong position to exert influence on how its military forces are utilized 
in this mission. Japan’s military facility in Djibouti, the first of its kind since World War 
II, provides a base of operations for future missions and contingencies that further push 
normalization and expand its original mission. Similarly, in 2013, authorization was 
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given to a Japanese ship to operate outside of the established IRTC to address threats 
beyond the scope of its original mission. Likewise, P-3C’s returning to Japan from Africa 
are now addressing Japanese concerns in the South China Sea before returning home. 
Finally, the general level of international involvement and competition playing out in the 
Gulf of Aden and Djibouti is like none other experienced by Japan in Africa, influencing 
its perceived security needs from the outside-in.  
In regard to the UN mission in South Sudan, I hypothesized that this mission, like 
all other UN missions, incrementally contributes to normalization, but unlike the Gulf of 
Aden mission, its mission scope limits any other opportunities for normalization. Some 
attributes are similar to Japan’s past UN missions, including a reliance on extensive 
financial contributions and a reluctance to put JSDF forces in harm’s way, leading one to 
expect a continuation of a trend often seen since the 1990s. The economic and geo-
political impact of this mission is relatively high, however, perhaps increasing a Japanese 
resolve to ensure their troops can continue to participate in the mission despite its 
increasing demands. The incremental contribution to normalization is observed to the 
extent that Japan is merely trying to keep pace with the evolving nature of UN missions 
that are themselves becoming more dangerous; however, UNMISS has provided unique 
opportunities, relative to past UN missions, to challenge prior assumptions of the JSDF 
and to operate as a more normal military. For example, by authorizing the issue of 
ammunition to South Korean forces taking part in UNMISS, Prime Minister Abe 
challenged prior arms export restrictions, and the incident likely had an influence in the 
eventual ratification of the “new” arms export laws in 2013. The security threat presented 
by UNMISS also influenced the Legislation for Peace and Security, a groundbreaking 
law ratified in 2015 that granted the JSDF new authority to exercise self-defense akin to 
normal militaries while expanding their roles within the UN mission. Specifically, it 
authorized participation in a wider range of peacekeeping operations and internationally-
coordinated efforts, permitted logistics support in instances deemed threatening to 
Japan’s peace and security, allowed Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defense, 
and clarified Prime Minister Abe’s new concept of “proactive force” in the protection of 
civilians and military personnel while performing non-combat related duties. Finally, the 
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fragile security environment in South Sudan influenced Japan’s collective self-defense 
laws which, when ratified in March of 2016, enabled the JSDF to come to the aid of other 
countries’ troops or UN personnel in line with their expanding missions. Given the 
influence that a challenging mission like UNMISS had to Japan’s new security 
legislation, I believe that it has, and will continue to contribute to normalization in 
regards to how other “normal” militaries operate when taking part in UN missions. 
B. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
The evolution of Japan’s security policies and the increased use of the JSDF has 
called into question the way that postwar Japan views itself and its place in the world. 
The current international environment especially presents both unique challenges and 
opportunities for Japan to reassess this identity. Successful mission accomplishment in 
Africa has allowed the SDF to gain credibility in the eyes of the Japanese public, and 
therefore allowed it to conceivably become an instrument of peace, rather than a reminder 
of the past. Motivated initially by a need for resources, Japan’s approach to Africa has 
gradually evolved into one that ties its political ambitions and humanitarian concerns 
with its security interests. Likewise, through successful mission accomplishment far from 
home, Japan’s military operations in Africa have reduced the limitations imposed on the 
JSDF, allowed the JSDF to improve its international prestige, and granted it useful 
operational experience on a scale not seen in Japan’s post-war history.  
As a more legitimate and active arm of Japanese foreign policy, the JSDF is now 
an integral part of Japan’s comprehensive development efforts in Africa, especially as 
Japan shows a willingness to export its principles of peace and security in order to protect 
its core interests. Likewise, at TICAD V in June 2013, the Japanese government placed 
peace and security as one of its top priorities in achieving its development objectives on 
the continent.231 This is a trend that started long before Prime Minister Abe, as Japan’s 
ability to “wage peace” has gotten stronger and stronger with each mission and with each 
constitutional reinterpretation. Japan’s partnership with Africa helps it to achieve its 
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broader strategic objectives—securing natural resources, opening growing markets to 
Japanese goods, strengthening its international standing, and defying an increasing 
Chinese presence—in an international competition for regional power under the brand-
name of peace. This also creates new expectations for international engagement that will 
likely lead Japan to continue to export its peace in other parts of Africa. 
According to its NSS, Japan seeks to “improve the global security environment 
and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community,” making Japan 
more and more a security provider and less a security consumer.232 This “normalcy” 
helps develop its global security role in partnership with the United States, especially 
given Prime Minister Abe’s assurances of being able defending a U.S. warship under 
attack in the Pacific under Japan’s new policy of collective defense, a policy influenced 
by Japan’s military operations in Africa. This alone shows that JSDF missions in Africa 
play a key role in Prime Minister Abe’s “historical mission” to amend the constitution.233 
With Africa’s rich resources and its position adjacent to the vast energy resources of the 
Middle East, any conflict in the Pacific will surely have wider, global implications. 
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